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Abstract 
Social media has become the milieu of choice to radicalize young impressionable 
minds by terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State.  While a plethora of 
research exists on the recruitment and propaganda efforts by terrorist organizations there is 
limited number of quantitative studies that observe the relationship of gender and the 
involvement in online radical milieus. This current research will build upon prior studies 
through the comparative analysis of 750 unique Twitter accounts supporting the IS and the 
affiliates of al-Qaeda that were non-randomly sampled between January and September of 
2015. The research aimed to address the questions of: 1) whether women that are involved in 
pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post substantively different amounts of content than men, 
2) whether women that are involved in pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post substantively 
different content than their male counterparts and, 3) whether the gender disparity in level and 
type of involvement on Twitter differ amongst the supporters of different jihadist 
organizations. This study found that, while pro-jihadist communities on Twitter continue to be 
dominated by male participation, female supporters of the IS are more active and post more 
violent content than women that support any other organization.  The intragroup differences 
found amongst the female supporters suggests that group ideology, recruitment and 
propaganda strategies play a role in the level of involvement of women in radical milieus. 
Keywords: Islamic State, social media, jihad, twitter, radicalization, gender, al 
Qaeda.
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Introduction 
Social media has become perceived as the medium of choice where young 
impressionable minds are radicalized with extremist ideology (Weidmann, 2015; Thompson, 
2011).  Facebook, Instagram, Ask.fm and Tumblr are all targeted by the media and researchers 
alike, with particular attention towards Twitter as the radical milieu of choice in recent times 
(Vidino & Hughes, 2015).  Twitter’s initial reluctance to infringe on members’ freedom of 
speech facilitated the establishment of a large number of online communities that support 
jihadist organizations around the world.   The variety of online support that is garnered for the 
jihadist organizations like al Qaeda, its affiliates1, and the IS has been attributed to their 
differing recruitment and propaganda strategies (Sheppard, 2016; Stern & Berger, 2015).   
While the internet has been previously utilized by jihadist organization to disseminate 
their message, the active recruitment of women through social media is an emerging public 
policy concern.  Official propaganda distributed by al Qaeda and the IS has revealed little 
difference between the perceived roles that women play within their organization, that is, that 
there is no need for women fulfilling roles outside their intended domestic realm (Huey, 2015).  
The supporters of the IS, however, frequently disseminate content on social media that portrays 
women as active combatants in the battlefield (Winter 2015).  Moreover, the IS has allowed 
women who are already radicalized to engage with potential female recruits on social media 
to further encourage others to migrate as well (Peresine & Cervone, 2015).  The transition 
away from ideologically driven propaganda that perpetuates the historically dichotomous 
                                                          
1 Al Qaeda affiliates consist of established terrorist groups and homegrown terrorist cell that receive some 
form of assistance from al-Qaeda.  Organizations affiliated with al Qaeda include, but are not limited to: Al 
Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Nusra Front, 
and Al Murabitoun (Humund et al., 2014) 
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gendered jihad by the IS’s online community through the depiction of active female 
involvement is a departure from others organizations such as al Qaeda, and has influenced the 
way online supporters interact amongst each other (Saltman & Smith, 2015).   
While previous quantitative research exists on the Twitter communities that support 
jihadist organizations, due to the collection of data with software that was unable to 
algorithmically determine an account owner’s gender, a comparative analysis between the 
level of online involvement on radical milieus and gender has not been previously conducted 
(Berger & Morgan, 2015).  Through the use of a comparative analysis between those who 
support different jihadist organizations, we can understand how the various propaganda and 
recruitment strategies of each group plays a part in influencing the way women participate 
within online radical milieus. Understanding the gender differences between male and female 
supporters will allow government agencies to better improve policies and programs to combat 
jihadist recruitment online.  
 This paper aims to build on existing literature through a comparative analysis of 
Twitter accounts that supported jihadist organizations in order to determine: 1) how the amount 
of content posted by men and women that support jihadist organizations on Twitter compared, 
2) whether women involved in pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post substantively different 
content then men, and 3) whether intragroup differences in the amount and type of content 
posted by women existed on Twitter.  In total, 750 unique Twitter accounts operated by both 
men and women were collected over the course of 9 months, January to September 2015.   
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Literature Review 
Historically, the active involvement of women within jihadist organizations was 
restricted by the interpretations of a gendered jihad, as well as what was considered acceptable 
female behavior within the organization (Von Knop, 2007).  This resulted in many women 
fulfilling the domestic and administrative roles of the organization while men were placed in 
leadership and combat positions.  The anonymity provided by the internet has allowed women 
to transgress the previously established gender norms that existed among jihadist and extremist 
organizations and become active participants online (Von Knop, 2007).  The evolution of the 
online jihad into the realm of social media further emancipated women and allowed them to 
become increasingly involved within their online community in a way that was not attainable 
in the early years of internet use by organizations such as al Qaeda.  Since then the participation 
of women in online radical milieus has continually grown.  It is important for researchers to 
understand how organizations have managed the recent influx of female involvement, as well 
as how their strategies to do so have influenced the way in which women participate online.     
In a post-9/11 world, extremists have taken advantage of the internet to effectively and 
inexpensively communicate, disseminate propaganda, and recruit supporters with little risk of 
reprisal from counterterrorism agencies (Blaker, 2015; Winn & Zakkem, 2009). During the 
initial adoption of the internet as the milieu of choice, the use of password protected discussion 
boards allowed existing members to communicate amongst one another with relative 
anonymity (Weimann, 2015).  The involvement within these networks was dominated by male 
membership due to the reliance on previously existing real-world contacts required to access 
the closed forums.  Discussion boards allowed registered members to converse on all topics 
related to their jihad; however, it was extremely difficult to disseminate their propaganda and 
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recruit additional followers outside of their network.  2008 marked the year that online 
terrorism departed from its reliance on obscure discussion boards and made its public debut 
(Weidmann, 2016).  Anwar al Awlaki, a Yemini-American Cleric began to post video-taped 
sermons calling for a violent jihad onto file-sharing services like YouTube (Maura, 2012).  The 
decision to make their jihad go public allowed existing members to engage with the general 
public to further develop their jihadist ideology. 
Jihadist organizations have been able to effectively leverage the social media 
platforms’ liberal views on the freedom of speech to disseminate their propaganda with little 
resistance.  The use of official websites was no longer needed to spread their extremist 
ideologies (Weimann, 2015).  Instead, the de-centralized nature of social media allowed for 
the rapid dissemination of propaganda amongst its growing base of followers.  The rapidity of 
growth amongst the pro-jihadist communities on social media resulted in an increase in public 
pressure to limit the distribution of hateful rhetoric (Stern & Berger, 2015).  As publicly owned 
social media sites began to remove pro-jihadist content and shut down the accounts that 
disseminated the content, jihadist groups found another platform to disseminate their message: 
Twitter.  
The reliance on Twitter to spread extremist ideology has resulted in varying degrees of 
success that has been dependent on the individual group’s recruitment strategies and the 
content of their propaganda (Weidmann, 2015; Stern and Berger, 2015).  Organizations such 
as Jabhat al-Nusra, a Syrian based affiliate of al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) have had 
great success in their social media campaigns and have gone so far to create dedicated media 
wings that focus specifically on the creation of propaganda and the engagement of their 
followers (BBC News, 2013; Becker, 2014). Through the use of battlefield footage, music 
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videos and multi-lingual documents, organizations are able disseminate their ideology to a 
wider audience than what was possible in the previous decade (Hall, 2012; Ali, 2015).  The IS 
in particular has demonstrated an aptitude for cultivating a large community of supporters 
through their use of Twitter that has exceeded the ability of other jihadist organizations 
(Hosken, 2015).   
IS’s propaganda section, al-Hayat, produces high quality recruitment videos that mimic 
the special effects seen in action movies, along with music videos and an online magazine 
(Blaker, 2015). The content of their propaganda often contains a juxtaposition of extreme 
violence with scenes of a utopic society (Stern & Berger, 2015).  Videos and pictures depicting 
beheadings, executions and battlefield footage stand in contrast to images of IS-run nursing 
homes and the building of city infrastructure (Hosken, 2015).  The IS propaganda helps to 
further their ideology while still appealing to a variety of audience members (Peresin, 2015).  
Discussions occurring on Twitter ranges from mundane life events to in-depth 
discussions of topics on their respective organization’s ideology (Hosken, 2015; UN News 
Centre, 2014; Weimann, 2014).  While it is common for organizations to declare battlefield 
victories or to claim a terrorist attack on social media, the IS frequently accompanies their 
posts with images of the death, torture and the executions of those who are considered to be 
unbelievers (Peresin, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015).  The exhibitionism of violence portrayed 
in the continuous stream of propaganda on social media is one of the features that defines the 
IS’s propaganda strategy from other organizations (Hosken, 2015).  The violence displayed 
towards Westerners and Muslims alike exists throughout the rhetoric of the IS and was partially 
attributed to the organizations separation from al Qaeda in 2014 (Stern & Berger, 2015).  The 
IS’s preference for violent battlefield theatrics and executions stands in stark contrast when 
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compared to al Qaeda’s prior propaganda that is focused on religious instruction and ideology 
(Malik, 2015).  This strategy has resulted in an increase in teenagers and young adults who 
express enthusiasm towards the support of the IS, likening the jihad to an adventure rather than 
a solemn religion tenet (Hosken, 2015).  
Interestingly, an emerging phenomenon is the relatively high proportion of women who 
are actively involved in the online community (Hosken, 2015). The IS and al-Qaeda viewed 
active female involvement of any type in the organization to be a dishonorable activity (Ducol, 
2012; Dienel et al., 2010).  The roles ascribed to women by global jihadist groups are often 
non-violent and include activities such as distributing Qurans in prisons, raising the next 
generation of jihadists or creating propaganda (Huey & Witmer, 2016). The anonymity 
provided by the internet gives women the opportunity to transgress the previously dichotomous 
gender norms of jihadist organizations and become actively involved in group dynamics online 
(Von Knop, 2006).  The anonymity of the internet has resulted in an increase in the relative 
proportion female membership and participation.  
In a response to the increased levels of female engagement online, jihadist 
organizations have developed a variety of approaches to garner additional female support on 
social media (Weidmann, 2016). Interestingly, the content of official propaganda that is 
directed towards women by the IS and al Qaeda share similar ideological underpinnings and 
views on female involvement.  Indeed, both organizations have official magazines with content 
found to be nearly interchangeable which revealed the belief that women are to remain in their 
ascribed domestic realm (Huey, 2015). For example, by creating a Twitter account The Zora 
Foundation, the IS was able to provide information geared specifically toward women 
(Peresin, 2015).  The Zora Foundation was designed to be easily accessible among on Twitter 
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and Facebook, aiming to prepare potential female recruits of the IS for their jihad.  The account 
propagates the important skills that women should be competent with prior to migrating to 
Syria or Iraq including: first aid, design and editing software to create propaganda, cooking 
and sewing (Peresin, 2015).  Much of the content distributed by the Zora foundation discussed 
topics similar to those propagated by al Qaeda; however, the online IS community has 
supplemented official propaganda with additional content that displays women as active 
participants on the battlefield (Winter, 2015).  Pictures of women holding Kalashnikovs or in 
a tactical formation are strewn across many of the female supporter’s accounts.  Though the 
realities of women living in the IS controlled territories are not reflective of the online content, 
the propaganda further encourages the online involvement of women on social media that 
exists in limited amounts amongst pro-al Qaeda supporters on Twitter (Havlicek, 2015). 
Research suggests that women share similar motivations to join jihadist networks as 
their male counterparts.  The battle against Muslim oppression, the creation of a utopic society 
and the comradery were all found were commonly cited as reasons to join groups such as the 
IS; however, the desire to seek adventure, was less common amongst women that had migrated 
(Magdey et al., 2015; Hoyle et al., 2014).  Capitalizing on the above wants of sisterhood and 
to be a part of a community, the IS has also utilized female contact points to actively recruit 
women on social media (Sheppard, 2015).   
Though al Qaeda had previously relied on conventional human interaction in key 
locations such as schools, religious centers or marketplace to aid in their recruitment efforts, 
they did not reappropriate this method in their social media campaign (Weimann, 2015).  The 
IS however, had encouraged those who are radicalized, with some living outside of the IS 
controlled territory, to actively engage with women that they are networked with on social 
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media (Hosken, 2015).  Through discussions on topics ranging from mundane life events to 
in-depth discussions of IS ideology, women are now able to develop and expand their own 
discourse in the online realm.  As such, the perceived active participation within the group 
dynamics encourages women to become active producers of discourse rather than remain 
passive consumers (Stern & Berger, 2015).  As such, the researchers hypothesized that the 
encouragement of active involvement through female contact points greatly increases the level 
of involvement by women when compared to jihadist organizations that rely solely on the 
dissemination of propaganda (Sheppard, 2015; Berger & Stern, 2015). 
 Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the IS have the ability to engage both men and 
women from around the world through their propaganda and recruitment efforts. Both the 
public and researchers alike have taken great interest in understanding the role social media 
plays in the formation of online pro-jihadist communities, however, little is known about how 
the level of involvement of men and women on Twitter is influenced through the various 
propaganda and recruitment efforts of jihadist organizations.  This paper aims to address this 
gap in the literature through the use of a comparative analysis between the indicators of the 
activity levels of men and women who support the IS, al Qaeda and its affiliates on Twitter.   
Methodology 
This paper is the result of a portion of the research garnered from a larger study that 
aimed to gain a greater understanding of the role of gender in influencing the selection of 
pathways through which individuals and groups can become radicalized.  This study 
specifically explored women’s participation in online spaces that served as radicalizing 
milieus.  The resultant paper aims to build on previous work by analyzing the similarities and 
differences in posting patterns of men and women who support different jihadist organizations 
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on Twitter in an effort to determine whether the level and type of interactions by women on 
Twitter is influenced through the ideology, propaganda, and recruitment strategy of the 
particular jihadist organization that they support.  In doing so, this study will address the three 
following research questions: 
R1: Do women who are involved in pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post 
substantively different amounts of content than their male counterparts? 
R2: Do women who are involved in pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post 
substantively different content from their male counterparts? 
R3: Does the gender disparity in level and type of involvement on Twitter differ 
amongst the supporters of different jihadist organizations? 
Sample 
From January to September of 2015 posts from the Twitter accounts of 750 online 
supporters of pro-jihad groups (Islamic State or al-Qaeda affiliated) were collected for a cross-
sectional analysis. To locate accounts that would be included in the study, we drew from a 
sample of followers of three prominent accounts that promote pro-jihad ideology. Due to the 
limited number of pro-jihadist supporting women that made their information public, snowball 
sampling was conducted on the previously collected Twitter accounts to increase the size of 
the sample. The result was a non-random sample of male and female supporters of IS and AQ 
affiliated groups.   
Independent Variables 
  Two independent variables were included to explore the interaction between gender 
and the amount of activity of pro-jihadist Twitter accounts.  The Twitter user’s gender was 
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categorized as: 1) male, 2) female.  Indicators used to determine the gender of a Twitter user 
included: 1) the use of male or female titles for usernames and Twitter handles; 2) pictures of 
female or male avatars or background photos, and; 3) self-referencing using terms such as 
‘mother’ ‘daughter’ ‘fighter’ and ‘father’, among others.  
The second variable included was the jihadist organization that the Twitter account 
claimed to be affiliated with, which was coded as: 1) no affiliation; 2) IS; 3) Jabhat al-Nusra2 
, and; 4) al-Qaeda affiliated.  The decision to include the above organizations within the study 
allowed for a comparison of how the ideological differences, recruitment strategies and content 
of propaganda influenced the disparity between gender and the level and type of interaction on 
online milieus.  The criteria used to identify an account’s group affiliation included: 1) pictures 
of the organizations emblem, black standard or prominent figurehead as a profile or 
background photograph; 2) whether the account posted content that explicitly stated their 
support for a specific group, and; 3) the use of the organization’s name within the account’s 
Twitter handle or description.  Accounts that were involved in the pro-jihadist radical milieus 
of Twitter, but did not contain the above criteria, were coded as having no affiliation. 
Dependent Variables 
Several dependent variables were utilized in this study as indicators of the level and 
type of involvement of an individual within their network.   In total, five variables were 
measured which included the number of Tweets posted by the account, the number of times an 
account retweeted content that was created by another user, the number of times an account 
                                                          
2 While it is recognized that Jabhat al-Nusra is an affiliate of al-Qaeda the decision to create a separate 
category in the analysis based on several reasons.  Firstly, Jabhat al-Nusra has grown into one of al-Qaeda’s 
largest affiliates with a membership of roughly 5 000 and have developed their own official media outlet (The 
White Minaret).   Secondly, Jabhat al-Nusra has competing interests with the IS in Syria and frequently 
contends over the recruitment of foreign fighters.   
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posted content per day, the number of followers per account and, the number of accounts that 
the user followed.  The above measures help to determine whether women are as well 
connected, or interacting as frequently, as their male counterparts.  Greater gender parity within 
a group of supporters for a jihadist organization would suggest that the recruitment and 
propaganda efforts are cultivating a larger and more involved female following. 
This data was gathered in two ways.  First, the number of tweets, followers and those 
that the account followed were collected directly from the account’s Twitter page.  Additional 
information was collected using the web browser extension NCapture which was subsequently 
analyzed through NVIVO to determine the number of retweets per account and the number of 
times the account tweeted per day.  The dependent variables listed above have been used in 
prior research that analyzed the Twitter accounts of jihadist networks and have proven to be 
successful in measuring one’s involvement within the milieu (Berger & Morgan, 2015).  
To add another layer of depth to the analysis, the type of content that was most often 
posted by an account was collected and coded into the following categories: 1) no explicit 
content, 2) expressions of sympathy for their organization and its members, 3) moral support 
for the organization and its members, 4) offers of material support, 5) violent content, and 6) 
displaying a willingness to engage in violence.  The analysis of the type of content posted 
provides the opportunity to determine whether the ideology, and the recruitment and 
propaganda strategies of each organization influences the way that women participate within 
the milieu.  To determine the type of content propagated by a Twitter user, postings were 
collected through NCapture, a web browsing extension that gathers all postings by a Twitter 
account. The account’s first 20 posts were coded into the above categories.  This method of 
content analysis for large networks has proven successful in prior research (Klausen, 2015). A 
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limiting factor is that the content analyzed was posted over a short period of time when the 
accounts were very active. 
Control Variables 
Several control variables were utilized in this study.  First, the age of the Twitter users 
was coded as: 1) unknown, 2) 15-19, 3) 20-24, 4) 25-29, 5) 30-34, and 6) 35 and above.  Prior 
research has found that the majority of participants in pro-jihadist milieus on Twitter are 
predominately teenagers and young adults.  This was reflected in the decision to create five 
year age intervals up to the age of 34 with a category that included the limited number of 
accounts that disclosed an age of 35 and above.  The user’s self-disclosed nationality was 
coded as: 1) Unknown, 2) North American, 3) European, 4) African, 5) Middle Eastern, and 
6) Asian.  Finally, the user’s self-disclosed location was coded as follows: 1) Unknown, 2) 
North America, 3) Africa, 4) Europe, 5) Middle East, 6) Syria and Iraq, and 7) Asia.  The 
measurement of these variables provides researchers with the demographic information of 
jihadist supporters which adds another layer of depth to the analysis. 
Analysis 
This paper offers a comparative analysis of posting patterns by gender among 
supporters of jihadist organizations on Twitter.  Due to the non-random sampling techniques, 
the results of this study lack external validity.  As a result, an in-depth descriptive analysis of 
the demographics of the sample was conducted.  In the descriptive analyses, we compare the 
age, nationality and location of the supporters by gender and their group affiliation.  Following 
the descriptive analysis, we observe the relationship between the level of activity on Twitter 
by gender and group affiliation in a cross-tabulation of the measures of central tendency.  We 
then compared the type of interactions by gender and affiliation.   
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER IN PRO-JIHADIST COMMUNITIES  13 
 
Results 
 Table 1 displays the demographics of the sample by gender and group affiliation as a 
percent. As previously stated, the sample of this study was comprised of men and women who 
were involved in pro-jihadist Twitter communities that supported the IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and 
the other affiliates of al-Qaeda. The IS supporters comprised the largest portion of observations 
in this study (N=291).  Additionally, 49 percent of the overall sample consisted of female 
respondents. Table 1 displays the sample characteristics and distribution of the independent 
and control variables.  Those involved in pro-jihadist Twitter communities are a hidden 
population that makes deliberate attempts to conceal their identities.  Although unfortunate for 
research purposes, it is not surprising that 35 percent of respondents did not disclose their age 
and roughly 20 percent of respondents did not disclose their nationality or location.  When age 
was disclosed, over half of the sample stated they were under 30 years old.  Among those who 
disclosed their nationality, approximately 40 percent stated that they belonged to a country in 
the Middle East with another 20 percent claiming to belong to a European nation.  
Table 2 displays the variables that indicate the level of involvement in pro-jihadist 
communities on Twitter by gender and group affiliation.   Men and women that supported pro-
jihadist organizations exhibited several differences in their level of involvement on Twitter as 
well as the type of content that they posted.  All the women in the sample were not as active 
as their male counterparts when the total amount of content posted per account was compared.  
However, when tweets per day was analyzed, women that supported the affiliates of al-Qaeda 
as well as those who claimed no specific affiliation were more active than their male 
counterparts.  This could partly be explained by the shorter account lengths of the women in 
the sample. Men supporting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra posted significantly more content per 
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day than women supporting the same organizations.  Men supporting the IS posted 25 percent 
more content then women per day with men supporting Jabhat al-Nusra posting 30 percent 
more content which translated into 229 and 181 more pieces of content throughout the lifetime 
of the accounts.  
The ratio of tweets to retweets does help illuminate how often supporters create new 
content compared to distributing previously generated content.  The ratio of tweets to retweets 
between the men and women supporting different organizations were similar with the 
exception of those who supported al-Qaeda’s affiliates.  The results suggest that men do not 
play a larger role in the creation of new content in their respective communities.  One caveat 
is that this study only observed what Twitter would deem as a tweet or a retweet.  Therefore, 
content that is continually redistributed by community members without being retweeted 
would be considered original content in this analysis.  It is likely that the redistribution of 
content is higher that the tweet to retweet ratio suggests.  
With exception to those supporting the IS, men had considerably larger numbers of 
followers per account on average than women.  The Twitter accounts of women and men 
supporting the IS had a similar number of followers on average per account, however, women 
followed more accounts on average than their male counterparts.  The results from this study 
suggests that, with exception of those that support the IS, men involved in pro-jihadist 
communities continue to be better connected and more active than their female counterparts.   
Interestingly, the levels of involvement were noticeably different between female IS 
supporters and the women who supported other organizations. When the duration of the 
Twitter account was taken into consideration, female IS supporters posted between 0.7 and 1.2 
times per day more than the women in the other two groups.  The higher amount of tweets per 
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day translated into 639 posts per account on average compared to 554 for Jabhat al-Nusra 
supporters and 693 for al-Qaeda supporters; despite having an average account length that was 
two to five months less than the other groups in the sample.  The results of this analysis does 
suggest that the recruitment and propaganda strategies aimed at increasing female participation 
online by the IS has resulted in increased levels of participation by women that was not 
observed in other terrorist organizations. 
Overall, the IS supporters had the shortest account durations among all groups in the 
sample.  The average account length for both men and women support IS was 11 months on 
average.  The lower account duration can be attributed to Twitter’s recent crackdown on 
accounts violating the terms and service agreement through the posting of violent images.  The 
posting of propaganda that is peppered with violence has been a feature of much of the content 
distributed among IS supporters (Hosken, 2015).  Research suggests that accounts that are the 
most active within pro-jihadist communities are more likely to post content that violates terms 
of service and are, therefore, at an increased risk of becoming removed from Twitter (Berger 
& Morgan, 2015).  Table 3 does suggest that, despite the increased closure of accounts posting 
violent content by Twitter, the content being posted by IS supporters continues to be riddled 
with violence. 
Table 3 displays the type of content posted by gender and group affiliation by percent.  
With the exception of al-Qaeda affiliated groups, men posted comparatively larger amounts of 
content was deemed to be an incitement of violence. Content that expressed a willingness to 
engage in violence was the least frequent type of material to be posted within this study’s 
sample. The most common type of content posted by both men and women in the sample was 
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moral support – considered support or help at a psychological level – to either the organization 
or individual fighters.   
Another disparity found between female supporters of the IS and the women who 
supported other organizations surrounded the type of content being posted.  When compared 
to women in other organizations, women supporting the IS posted far more violent content.  IS 
supporters posted between 5 and 13 percent more content that was considered to incite and 
support violence than any other group.  This trend did not occur when we compared the amount 
of content that displayed a willingness to engage in violence.  Also, women supporting the IS 
posted less content that expressed sympathy towards fallen fighters when compared to other 
organizations.  It is likely that women supporting the IS are less sympathetic because the fallen 
soldier is often celebrated as a martyr in the IS community. 
Overall men were more actively involved in their respective groups than women, with 
the exception of those who did not specify which group they supported.  Men also posted 
violent content more frequently than women.  When comparing women from the different 
groups of supporters, those who supported the IS participated at higher rates.  The indicators 
of activity to suggest that the IS’s unique approach towards the recruitment of females has been 
effective at promoting an increased involvement amongst supporters that are women.    
Discussion 
Supporters of jihadist organizations on Twitter have grown into established 
communities that are well connected and highly active (Berger & Morgan, 2015; Weidmann, 
2016).  The results of this study suggest that while men continue to play a dominant role among 
the supporters of jihadist organizations on social media, female involvement online has become 
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a significant subset of the pro-jihadist community. The anonymity provided by the internet has 
allowed women to transgress the previously established gender norms that exist among jihadist 
and extremist organizations (Von Knop, 2007).  Without fear of reprisal, women were 
observed as being able freely interact online. 
The emancipatory nature of the internet that was theorized by Von Knop does help us 
to understand why the majority of the women observed in this study were actively involved in 
their community; however, it does not offer an explanation towards the variation found 
amongst the female supporters of the different jihadist organizations.  This study found that 
women supporting the IS were more active than women supporting any of the other jihadist 
organizations. The IS supporters frequently posted more content than any other group of 
women with higher amounts of the posted content containing violence.  To explain this 
phenomenon, we referred to prior research on IS’ ideology and recruitment strategies.   
Media reports have found that the ideology of the IS contains a dichotomous attitude 
towards the roles and responsibilities of women within the newly established caliphate 
(Gardner, 2015).  On one end of the spectrum women are considered to exist as sub-humans 
and are treated as commodities that are to be sold or provided to fighters as a reward.  On the 
other end, the IS considers women to be fulfilling an essential role in their efforts to further 
develop their utopic society (Gardner, 2015).  To establish their caliphate, the IS aggressively 
recruits new members on social media platforms and other milieus (Stern & Berger, 2015).  In 
their effort to recruit additional followers, the IS implemented a method that was not utilized 
by groups such as al-Qaeda.  Rather than simply distributing propaganda, the IS has employed 
indoctrinated women that were previously recruited from Western countries to act as contact 
points for other potential female recruits (Shephard, 2016).   
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 The IS’ use of women as contact points has provided them with the ability to actively 
engage their female supporters.  The use of individuals as contact points for potential recruits 
was frequently employed by al-Qaeda in a pre-9/11 world; however, it was never adapted to 
be used on social media platforms (Weidmann, 2015).  The IS was able to reinvent this 
recruitment strategy to be used in today’s online world which marked a drastic departure from 
competing organizations recruitment and propaganda strategies (Shephard, 2016; Weidmann, 
2015) Topics range from the mundane to conversations that are deeply rooted in IS ideology 
(Shephard, 2016).  As such, women supporting the IS are actively engaged within their online 
communities.  The heightened level of interaction among female members supporting the IS 
observed in this study does indicate that the IS’s use of female contact points has resulted in 
increased participation among their female supporters.  The broader implication of this 
increased involvement through direct communication and recruitment is the potential for the 
radicalization of additional women followed by their subsequent migration to IS-controlled 
territory.  As women are becoming more actively involved as participants in pro-jihadist 
communities, both social media platforms and government agencies must create policies to 
mitigate this type of risk towards public safety.    
The results of this study can also contribute to the growing discussion involving the 
formation of policy aimed at combatting jihadism on social media.  The prevalence of violent 
propaganda, threats of future terrorism offences and the active recruitment of foreign fighters 
on Twitter resulted in a mounting of public pressure for Twitter to control a growing social 
problem (Yadron, 2016).  Twitter responded to the increased pressure by revising their policies 
to remove Twitter users who posted hateful and violent content.  The reformulation of the 
terms of service resulted in the closure of 125, 000 accounts linked to pro-jihadist organizations 
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since the mid-2015 (Calamur, 2016).  The consistent suspension of accounts that supported 
terrorism was believed to result in fewer terrorists online and would thus reduce the 
effectiveness of IS’ propaganda strategy (Wright et al., 2016). It is important to note however 
that while the majority of the population will be exposed to some form of jihadist propaganda 
during their time spent on the internet and social media, very few will become involved in pro-
jihadist communities on Twitter.  Among those that do become involved within these 
communities, even fewer will become radicalized (Saltman & Smith, 2015).  What will follow 
is a review of the effectiveness of Twitter’s aggressive policy towards pro-jihadist accounts.  
 The sample in this study was collected during Twitters mass-removal of accounts 
linked to pro-jihadist networks. This created a unique opportunity to better understand how an 
aggressive policy that relied on the mass closure of accounts would impact the pro-jihadist 
community.  This study found Twitters policy shift did have a limited effect on the IS’ 
networks.  The results of this study found that both men and women posted approximately half 
the amount of content per day than was observed prior to the change in policy (Berger & 
Morgan, 2015).  However, the accounts included within this study reveals a community that 
continues to remain active and well connected despite the frequent closure of their accounts.  
Additionally, approximately 18.5 percent of the sample disseminated content that was 
dominated with violent imagery.  While there was no previous measure on the amount of 
content posted that is violent, this result does suggest that Twitter’s policy has also had an 
inadequate effect on limiting the dissemination of violent content. 
  An unintended consequence is this shift in policy is that the closure of accounts is now 
viewed as a badge of honor among pro-IS community members (Huey & Witmer, 2016).  
Oftentimes a new account is created shortly after the initial closure.  The new accounts 
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frequently post a screenshot of the notification that their previous account was closed due to 
posting prohibited content that they had received by Twitter in an attempt to prove that they 
are ‘hardcore’ jihadists.  A growing body of literature suggests that most terrorist supporters 
simply start over and reconnect with other users the day after their initial account was closed 
(Stern & Berger, 2015; Wright et al. 2016).  The continual cycle of the closing and reopening 
of Twitter accounts is considered by some to be an ineffective counter terrorism strategy, and 
has been referred to as a virtual game of whack-a-mole (Stern and Berger, 2015; Wright et al., 
2016; Arthur, 2014).  
The constant closure of Twitter accounts also creates a difficult environment for law-
enforcement agencies, counter-terrorism experts and researchers to locate and surveil those at 
risk of becoming further radicalized as the process of radicalization online occurs over an 
extended period of time (Von Behr et al. 2013).  The constant closure and reopening of 
accounts can further muddy law-enforcement’s perspective of whether an individual has 
become further radicalized.  It is likely that the decision to stop closing accounts may result in 
a larger number of pro-jihadist account holders on Twitter, however, it would provide law 
enforcement agencies with the ability to look at the entire life-course of a Twitter account 
rather than requiring them to have to develop a storyline from a collage of previously created 
accounts.   
 Finally, prior research has indicated that a large portion of women involved in pro-IS 
communities are unlikely to become more deeply involved in terrorist activities (Huey & 
Witmer, 2016).  A large portion of those that support jihadist networks are drawn towards the 
allure of belonging to a subversive network.  Those that posted more ideologically-oriented 
posts would frequently display contradictions in their behaviors and attitudes either in their 
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subsequent posts or through their avatars.  A large portion of the supporters in this sample 
consisted of teenagers and young adults and it is likely that many will age out of their 
involvement without the use of aggressive social media policies.  Due the reasons stated above, 
the results of this study and additional research do suggest that a shift in policy would provide 
a more effective counter-terrorism strategy. 
Limitations 
As with any study of a hidden population, the research was not without limitations.  
First, the identity of Twitter users in the sample can be concealed through the anonymity 
provided by the internet.  An account holder has the ability to post false information, use stock 
photos as their profile photo or disable the geo-location of their posts to further conceal their 
identity.  Due to the deviant nature of participating in pro-jihadist communities it is likely that 
a portion of the account holder’s personal information has been falsified.  Additionally, many 
accounts supporting jihadist organizations kept their content private and did not post publicly.  
The non-random manual sample of Twitter accounts was conducted to identify accounts that 
were blatantly dishonest in revealing their personal information to minimize this type of error.   
A second limitation of this study was the lack of generalizability.  The population of IS 
supporters on Twitter alone continually fluctuates on a regular basis and has been estimated to 
be between 40,000 and 100,000 users (Berger & Morgan, 2015).  This estimation does not 
include those supporting other organizations.  Additionally, a non-random sample was 
conducted to ensure enough women were included in the study.  Due to the above reasons the 
study was limited to a descriptive analysis of a portion of the pro-jihadist supporters on Twitter. 
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  Finally, the methodology used for the content analysis was based on previous work on 
jihadist social media accounts (Klausen, 2015).  An inherent limitation of this method was that 
only a small portion of an accounts total number of tweets were analyzed.  The analysis of a 
limited number of tweets may not fully represent the overall content that is posted by each 
account. 
   While this study had several limiting factors, it provides greater insight into how group 
ideology, recruitment, and propaganda strategies influence the way men and women interact 
on a radical milieu.  Further research into account holders that did not post content publicly 
would also provide a greater understanding of how men and women interact in the more closely 
knit communities of pro-jihadist supporters.  Jihadist organizations such as the IS and al-Qaeda 
constantly reformulate the way they spread their propaganda to recruit additional followers.  
Twitter is but one of many different social media platforms used to spread pro-jihadist 
ideologies and it is imperative to understand the differing effects that each social media 
platform has on the user base.  Therefore it is recommended that additional research should 
observe how different social media platforms are exploited to pass on, debate and internalize 
information. 
  Social media has become tool of social change and identity formation in much of the 
developed world.  Many of its uses have improved the way we live and interact with one 
another; however, it has also been utilized as a tool for insidious purposes.  Jihadist 
organizations have been able to successfully radicalize and recruit supporters through the 
relentless distribution of propaganda on social media platforms.   Interestingly, the unique 
approach to recruiting women through already radicalized women has resulted in female IS 
supporters participating at increased rates than women who support any other organization 
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within this study.  Despite Twitter’s recent efforts to mitigate the dissemination of IS content 
on their platform, pro-jihadist supporters remain well connected and active.  This research 
helps build on the existing body of literature to help provide law enforcement officials, 
governmental agencies and private corporations with the resources required to implement 
evidence based-policy. 
Conclusion 
 This paper aimed to further develop an understanding of whether the ideology, 
propaganda, and recruitment strategy influenced how women interact in a radical milieu 
through the comparative analysis of 750 unique Twitter accounts.  The results of this study 
found that men continue to dominate much of the discourse within the online communities of 
Twitter.  However, the recruitment and propaganda strategies of each pro-jihadist community 
on Twitter does play a part in the level and type of interaction exhibited by the female 
supporters.  This study suggests that organizations which create gendered propaganda and 
employ contact points to engage women within their online community have closer gender 
parity amongst its supporters.  The insights gleaned from this study will help to better inform 
further research surrounding the use of social media by pro-jihadist communities. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Demographics of Sample by Gender and Group Affiliation, by Percent 
 
Table 2. Indicators of Activity by Group Affiliation, by Group Averages 
Indicators of               
Activity 
No Specified 
Affiliation Islamic State Jabhat al-Nusra 
al-Qaeda and 
Affiliates 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male  Female 
Total Tweets 932 624 868 639 732 554 946 693 
Tweet to Retweet Ratio 2.4 2 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.4 1.2 
Tweets Per Day 2.3 3.8 3.5 2.8 2.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 
Followers 433 234 324 311 374 255 582 319 
Following 647 289 302 434 338 164 620 346 
Follower to Following Ratio 5.5 7.5 3.1 1.9 4.2 4.4 4.7 1.4 
Account Length 19 10 11 11 12 17 18 13 
  Group Affiliation 
 No Affiliation Islamic State Jabhat al-Nusra al-Qaeda 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Age         
     15-19 5 8 7 9 10 13 5 18 
     20-24 16 30 21 18 11 14 9 27 
     25-29 38 38 32 44 43 54 43 44 
     30-34 13 15 21 13 21 15 14 22 
     35+ 29 8 19 17 14 4 30 0 
     Total 100 (48) 100 (26) 100 (68) 100 (71) 100 (28) 100 (26) 100 (44) 100 (9) 
Nationality         
     North American 13 6 9 13 4 0 6 7 
     European 13 20 18 21 8 20 14 7 
     African 3 2 4 7 2 2 3 2 
     Middle Eastern 53 33 25 28 39 36 42 27 
     Asian 10 9 11 7 20 14 12 17 
     Unknown 8 30 23 24 27 29 23 41 
     Total 100 (62) 100 (66) 100 (141) 100 (150) 100 (51) 100 (56) 100 (66) 100 (59) 
Location         
     North American 15 14 11 17 6 7 6 8 
     European 11 24 11 22 16 25 9 19 
     Africa  5 2 1 6 2 0 5 0 
     Middle East  40 12 22 17 24 16 29 15 
     Syria/Iraq 5 17 20 15 25 4 18 10 
     Asia  11 8 9 5 14 20 12 15 
     Unknown 13 24 26 18 14 29 21 32 
     Total 100 (62) 100 (66) 100 (141) 100 (150) 100 (51) 100 (56) 100 (61) 100 (59) 
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Table 3. Content by Group and Gender, by Percent 
 
No Specified 
Affiliation 
Islamic State Jabhat al-Nusra al-Qaeda 
Content Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
  None 21 26 11 15 10 20 12 19 
  Sympathy 19 38 6 11 19 18 26 25 
  Moral 40 29 46 51 41 45 47 37 
  Material 3 3 6 5 8 5 5 9 
  Inciting Violence 13 2 23 15 18 9 9 9 
  Engaging in Violence 3 3 7 3 4 3 2 2 
  Total 100(62) 100(66) 100(141) 100(149) 100(51) 100(56) 100 (66) 100 (59) 
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